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unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

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During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to [874] power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

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The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

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668 for the rapid conclusion of the land reform and the establishment of Communist political power in the rural areas in this region. By November 1949, an estimated 800,000 peasants had joined the Peasants' Association in eighteen counties in the special district of South Kiangsu.[49] Even in the province of Fukien, the last province to be seized by the Communists, an estimated membership of nine million was reported.[50]

668 The militia is an instrument of terror at
• 701 the disposal of the Party. An organization of poor peasants and farm laborers (67 per cent) and of youth (aged 18-30), it is strongly class conscious.

At the end of the land reform in November 1951, the strength of the militia in the East China Region[51] was reported at 2,900,000. In addition to the normal duties assigned to the militia in this region, such as guarding granaries, bridges and transportation centers, the militia was also responsible for coastal defense. Militia units in the provinces of Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu were noted for their role in coastal operations. In a twenty-month period

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49. Ibid., November 12, 1949, p. 5.
50. Ibid., July 14, 1950, p. 3.
51. Liu Jui-lung's report on the conclusion of land reform in the East China Region, Ibid., November 29, 1951, p. 1.

668 to April 1951, the Fukien militia fought 5,829
701 "battles" in co-operation with the Communist regular troops, and engaged in 4,514 "battles" on its own.[52] This included many "engagements" in defense of the China coast.

B. Consolidation Period (1952-1953)

668 As the Land Reform Movement came to a close, Communist power was established in the region in spite of serious defects reported. The infiltration of "reactionary" elements into the Party organization and the increase of the "new-rich" among Party members, for example, necessitated the expulsion of an estimated 10 per cent of the Party members in the province of Shantung. The general apathy of Party cadre, as a result of low level of education and the unlimited demand imposed upon the Party members, caused some incidents suggesting political instability. Of particular concern was the Wu-to ("five-too-many") phenomenon.[53] Party members found themselves assigned too many jobs -- an average of four jobs per person. And Party members had to attend

52. Ibid., April 28, 1951, p. 5.

53. The five-too-many included: too many tasks, too many meetings, too many forms, too many organizations, and too many concurrent jobs.

647 Government, similar departments and bureaus
625 are organized at all levels, extending down to the public security commissions in the hsiang. The public security system is one of extreme centralization and is operated entirely by the Communist Party.

In the East China Region prior to 1954, a Department of Public Security under the East China Military and Political Committee was maintained. Because of the need for secrecy, and perhaps because of the sinister role it played, information on its organization and activity is not available. However, a report from the Nationalist Government on Formosa indicated[20] that the organization was composed of eight sections: political security, police, border security, armed security, "Reform-through-labor" (forced labor), intelligence, and personnel. Security cadre schools, security regiments, and other security commands were reported to be under the direct jurisdiction of this department. At the provincial level, the department maintained an elaborate organization, comprised of an administrative office and offices devoted to political security, security administration, police, general service, and Reform-through-labor. Other units such as the security cadre schools, coastal public security bureaus, and forced labor battalions were included.

•701 In addition to the public security agencies in the East China Region, military authorities also shared a considerable responsibility in the maintenance of "public order and safety." The Military Control Committee in the major cities had been

20. Organizational Chart, Communist Military, Public Security and Intelligence Organization, Taipei, 1953.

701 an important instrument in public security work. Military authorities are particularly active along the coast where attack from Formosa is possible. Thus, Yeh Fei, present governor of Fukien, is also the commanding general of the Fukien military district and of the 10th Army Corps of the Chinese Red Army, which is deployed opposite the Formosa strait. The Shanghai Military Control Committee, with Ch'en I, commanding general of the old Third Field Army, as its head, has jurisdiction in matters of military and public security.

625 687 2. Public Security in Rural Areas During the land reform, the regime relied upon the Peasants' Association, the militia, and the People's tribunals for the elimination of landlords and "despots" and the enforcement of decrees. According to an order of the East China Military and Political Committee, concerning the punishment of landlords,[21] issued in September 1950, those who were accused of falsifying reports of property, the destruction or sale of property, the killing of cattle, and the destruction of farming implements were given one year's imprisonment. Creating rumors with a view toward misrepresenting government policy, distribution of land without the authority of the Peasants' Association, and other acts tending to lead to the disruption of rural government were crimes justifying a sentence of at least five years' imprisonment. The death

21. Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compendium of Law and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies of the Central Government], Peking, Financial and Economic Committee of the Gov't Adm. Council, 1952.

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633 1899, when it was finally agreed (largely as a result of diplomatic
651 pressure) that no Chinese taxes could be collected within the foreign settlements except maritime customs dues (administered by an organ of the Chinese Government staffed by foreigners and Chinese) and the land tax (since the land remained Chinese property), while the Shanghai Municipal Council was free to tax both foreign and Chinese residents of the Settlement.

648 Neither the Shanghai Municipal Council nor the foreign consuls
701 at Shanghai were ever legally empowered to hinder the passage of Chinese troops through the foreign settlements, although Chinese troops were successfully excluded by *force majeure* and diplomatic bluff from the time of the first threat to the foreign settlements at the so-called Battle of Muddy Flat in 1853.* However, all of the Western powers having treaty relations with China claimed the right to land their own troops in the Settlements for the protection of the property and lives of their citizens. While this right was never formally enunciated in any treaty or agreement, it was practised on numerous occasions when troops landed from foreign warships in the harbor joined the Shanghai Volunteer Corps in defending the Settlement. The foreign settlements were never invaded by a hostile force (although bombs and shells landed there in 1932 and 1937), nor occupied by Chinese troops, from 1853, when the Volunteer Corps was formed, until Japan's assault on China engulfed all of the city after Pearl Harbor in 1941.

648 The most important right of the foreigners at Shanghai was
692 extraterritoriality, which placed citizens of all powers having most-favoured-nation agreements with China under the jurisdiction of their own national laws wherever they went within China. This principle was first enunciated in the Treaty of Wang Hsia between China and the United States in 1843, and the law was in practice administered to foreigners by their own consular courts. Extraterritoriality gave the foreigners advantages in business and in security of person and property; at Shanghai it was the only solid legal basis

* An incident in the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), when Shanghai was for long periods surrounded by rebel or imperial forces. On this occasion, the foreign residents of the city, aided by crews from their ships in the harbor, cleared out a large encampment of imperial troops which had been established within the Settlement boundaries. See F. L. Pott, *A Short History of Shanghai* (1928).